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Through the $3 billion US Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) Act of 
2009, or “Cash for Clunkers” program, nearly 700,000 consumers scrapped fuel-
inefficient vehicles in exchange for rebates of $3,500 or $4,500 toward the purchase of a 
new, more fuel-efficient vehicle.  This research aims to provide a more comprehensive, 
life cycle accounting of environmental and economic benefits associated with CARS. 
 
Environmental benefits included reduction in both greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant 
emissions.  A life cycle accounting suggests that CARS prevented 4.4 million metric tons 
of CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas emissions.  This is substantially lower than estimates 
in previous studies, which failed to include the life cycle effect of additional emissions 
produced during new vehicle production and overestimated vehicle-miles remaining in 
the life of ‘clunkers’.  Using previously estimated damage costs of $21 per metric ton of 
CO2, this benefit is worth $93 million.  About 20,000 metric tons of criteria pollutant 
emissions were also avoided.  Damage costs from criteria pollutants vary by geographic 
location and source height, which previous studies do not account for. Incorporating these 
factors suggests the benefits from avoided criteria pollutants were worth $17 million (two 
to six times greater than estimates using simple average or median damage costs). 
 
CARS also provided economic stimulus on a macroeconomic level and for participants.  
The economic literature suggests the program induced sales of up to 450,000 new 
vehicles; provided up to 62,000 job-years; and contributed up to $4 billion in gross 
domestic product.  Comparing the market value of scrapped vehicles to the rebate from 
CARS, the consumer surplus or “gift” to participants is calculated to be up to $2 billion 
(about $2,000 to $3,000 per vehicle).  This is significantly more than offered in previous 
vehicle scrappage programs, and suggests opportunities to get more environmental and 
economic “bang for the buck” with lower rebates, an alternate mechanism for setting 
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In 2009, the US Congress passed the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) 
Act, also known as the Car Allowance Rebate System or, more popularly, “Cash for 
Clunkers.”  Under the three billion dollar program, consumers were invited to scrap their 
fuel-inefficient vehicles in exchange for a rebate toward the purchase of a new and more 
fuel-efficient vehicle.  The program was intended to provide both economic and 
environmental benefits by stimulating the struggling economy (and in particular the 
automotive sector) and removing some of the most inefficient and polluting vehicles from 
the roads. 
 
CARS was wildly popular among consumers and garnered significant media attention.  
Following the program’s completion, however, there was limited external assessment of 
the true impacts.  The most comprehensive assessment was completed by the 
administering agency, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) [1].  
Over the course of the following two years, several academic researchers, think tanks, 
and other organizations added their own analysis of the program’s impacts [2-12]. 
 
This research was begun in fall of 2009, shortly after CARS’ conclusion, to answer the 
question: “What impact did CARS have on greenhouse gas emissions from the US 
vehicle fleet?”  Section 2 is devoted to addressing this question, and has been published 
in Environmental Research Letters [6].  It adds to the existing literature by adopting a full 
life cycle perspective of the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the program, 
whereas previous studies primarily focused on those emissions from vehicle usage (fuel 
combustion) and a few also considered upstream fuel impacts.  This research also 
provides a more detailed analysis than others available at the time of publication, using 
actual data on scrapped and new vehicles’ age, mileage, and other factors that affect life 
cycle emissions.  Finally, it addresses a number of sensitivities around important but 






Section 3, a paper currently being prepared for publication, builds on the analysis from 
Section 2 to further understanding of CARS’ environmental benefits and also consider 
the program’s economic impacts.  Four key questions are asked: What was the impact of 
CARS on life cycle emissions of criteria pollutants?  How much economic benefit did 
avoided emissions provide?  What kind of benefit did participating consumers receive 
from the program?  And how do all of these effects fit into the larger context of CARS’ 
many costs and benefits?  To answer these questions, the life cycle framework from 
Section 2 is used to analyze the impact on criteria pollutant emissions.  The mass of 
avoided pollutants is translated into economic benefit using existing estimates of 
pollution damage costs.  The economic stimulus that the program provided to participants 
is calculated as the difference between the rebate received and the trade-in market value 
of scrapped vehicles.  All of these benefits are considered in a framework developed to 
contextualize a number of the program’s largest macroeconomic, public good, and 
individual benefits and costs. 
 
CARS was just one example of an early vehicle retirement, or vehicle scrappage, 
program, which have been enacted across the US for several decades, though usually on a 
much smaller scale than CARS.  Sections 2 and 3 each review some of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on these types of programs and their intended and achieved impacts 
on environmental and economic indicators. 
 
Section 4, the conclusion, reviews the key findings from Sections 2 and 3.   It also 
provides directions for future research on CARS, and highlights ways that this research 











2.1.1. Cash for Clunkers program overview  
 
In June 2009, the U.S. Congress passed the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save 
(CARS Act, also known as the Car Allowance Rebate System or, more commonly, Cash 
for Clunkers.  Under the program rules, consumers traded in qualifying vehicles – 
passenger cars or light trucks getting less than 18 miles per gallon (mpg) and less than 25 
years old – and received a $3,500 or $4,500 rebate toward the purchase of a new, more 
fuel-efficient vehicle.  Retired vehicles were then destroyed, permanently removing them 
from the U.S. vehicle fleet.  By the time the $3 billion in funding was exhausted in 
August, nearly 700,000 old vehicles had been traded in and new ones purchased [13].  
The program was expected to provide economic benefits to consumers and the struggling 
economy, and to benefit the environment by removing some of the least fuel efficient 
vehicles from the road [14]. 
 
2.1.2. Accounting for emissions benefits in the existing literature 
 
2.1.2.1. Literature on CARS. Public communication about CARS frequently emphasized 
the program’s expected environmental benefits.  President Obama released a statement 
after the program’s first week, lauding its “environmental benefits well beyond what was 
originally anticipated” [15].  Estimates of the program’s environmental impact, and in 
particular the effect on fuel consumption and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, have 
been made prior to and since its conclusion.  Abrams and Parsons [2, 3] and Sachs [9] 
used the average fuel economy of scrapped and new vehicles to estimate savings of about 
280 gallons of gasoline per vehicle per year it would have remained on the road in the 
absence of CARS.  Abrams and Parsons estimated scrapped vehicles would have been 





ranging from 840 to 1,400 gallons per vehicle, or about 570 to 950 million gallons total.  
Knittel [5] similarly analyzed the program’s effect on GHG emissions, and he also 
considered the benefits from reduction of criteria pollutants.  For its report to Congress 
on the results of CARS, the Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA) [1] estimated total savings of 823 million gallons of 
gasoline, or just under 9.5 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent (CO2-e) emissions 
(including those from gasoline combustion and upstream impacts from fuel extraction, 
processing, and distribution).  The net effect of CARS on GHG emissions, however, is 
also influenced by factors other than the improvements in fuel economy.  The program 
encouraged early retirement of functional vehicles, and by extension, moved forward in 
time the production of new vehicles; both the disposal and manufacture of vehicles 
contributes to GHG emissions.  We believe that a life cycle assessment, which takes this 
fact into account, would provide a more accurate accounting of the GHG emissions 
impact of CARS. 
 
2.1.2.2. Literature on accelerated vehicle retirement programs.  Accelerated vehicle 
retirement programs (also known as scrappage programs) like CARS have been used for 
several decades.  Most of the literature on the environmental impacts of such programs 
focuses mainly on the reduced emissions during vehicle operation (e.g., [16-19]), 
however, these studies potentially overestimate the net emissions reductions.  Some of 
the recent literature has acknowledged the importance of a full life cycle perspective.  
Kim et al [20] addressed this issue and developed a model to calculate a vehicle lifetime 
that is optimal in terms of minimizing life cycle energy use and various vehicular 
emissions; Spitzley et al [21] built upon this work by also exploring the optimal lifetime 
from an economic standpoint, including the consumer’s ownership costs and societal 
pollution costs.  These two studies concluded that, depending on the pollutant or 
economic effect being prioritized and a vehicle’s annual miles traveled, optimal lifetime 
could range from 2 to 19 years. 
 
Van Wee et al [22] similarly suggested that assessments of scrappage programs need to 





Netherlands, they estimated an optimal vehicle lifetime that balanced the energy use from 
operation with the energy use from production and disposal.  They concluded that 
encouragement of accelerated vehicle retirement in the Netherlands might not actually 
reduce overall energy use or resulting emissions. Allan et al [23] reviewed characteristics 
of many vehicle scrappage programs from North America and Europe, demonstrating 
how program design could affect GHG emission reductions.  They also advocated for the 
use of a life cycle framework, and proposed a formula to evaluate the minimum 
improvement in fuel economy between trade-in and replacement vehicles necessary to 
result in a net emissions reduction after taking into account the emissions from new 
vehicle production. 
 
Despite the recognition that analyses of vehicle retirement programs should account for 
vehicle life cycle emissions, there has not yet been a study of CARS which fully includes 
this effect.  In fact, the U.S. Government Accountability Office [11] has criticized 
NHTSA for its failure to account for life cycle effects in its assessment of the program.  
We have developed a more comprehensive model to fill this gap in the literature by 




2.2.1. Life cycle system definition  
 
The life cycle GHG emissions impact of vehicles can be analyzed by separately 
considering the fuel cycle and the vehicle production and disposal cycle (figure 1).  The 
fuel cycle is made up of an upstream “well-to-tank” portion, which includes feedstock 
recovery and transportation, and fuel production and transportation; and the “tank-to-
wheel” portion, which accounts for the combustion of the fuel in the vehicle during use 
[24].  The “tank-to-wheel” or combustion phase accounts for approximately 80% of total 
fuel cycle GHG emissions from gasoline [25].  The vehicle production and disposal cycle 
includes material extraction, processing, and fabrication; component production; vehicle 





[24].  The vehicle production and disposal cycle contributes about 10% to 20% of the 
total vehicle life cycle greenhouse gas emissions [24, 26, 27]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Separate fuel and vehicle production & disposal cycles are used to evaluate the 
total vehicle life cycle impact. 
 
 
2.2.2. Modeling the effects of CARS on the life cycle system 
 
The greenhouse gas impact of CARS is modeled in a two-step process.   First, the impact 
of the program on the vehicle life cycle system is determined, so that the system may be 
compared with and without the program; next, those differences are used to calculate the 
emissions attributable to CARS.  
 
2.2.2.1. Life cycle system with CARS.  The schematic in figure 2a represents the life cycle 
of three successive vehicles, owned by one consumer, under the CARS scenario.  The 
horizontal axis represents the number of vehicle miles traveled (VMT).  The uppermost 
line represents the life cycle of Vehicle 1, owned by the consumer prior to announcement 
of the CARS program.  The circles represent the greenhouse gas emissions from 
production and disposal of that vehicle, p1 and d1.  The length of the bar represents the 
miles driven by that vehicle, at fuel economy m1.  
 
Under this scenario, the consumer drives x1 miles on the original vehicle, and then trades 





lifetime, Vehicle 2CARS produces emissions associated with production and disposal, 
p2CARS and d2CARS, and is driven x2 miles at fuel economy m2CARS before its own end of 
life.  (We assume that, without an incentive such as CARS to retire a vehicle early, the 
end of a vehicle life is determined by miles traveled, x2.)  At that time, the consumer 
would purchase the next vehicle, and so on. 
 
Only the retirement of Vehicle 1 and the purchase of Vehicle 2CARS are affected by 
CARS, due to the short-term nature of this program.  Therefore, the scope of analysis for 
this system is from mile zero on Vehicle 1 to the end of the life of Vehicle 2CARS, which 
occurs at mile x1+x2.  This area is shaded in figure 2. 
 
2.2.2.2. Life cycle system without CARS.  Figure 2b represents the life cycle of three 
successive vehicles without the CARS incentive program, the business-as-usual (BAU) 
scenario from which we calculate the differential impact of CARS. 
 
Vehicle 1 in this scenario is the same as Vehicle 1 under the scenario with CARS.  Its 
production, disposal, and fuel economy (p1, d1, and m1) are the same as described above.  
The lack of an incentive to retire the vehicle early, however, means that Vehicle 1 is 
driven for x2 miles, the expected life of a vehicle, before it is retired and replaced with 
Vehicle 2BAU. 
 
Vehicle 2BAU may or may not be the same model vehicle as the consumer purchases 
under the CARS incentive, Vehicle 2CARS.  Because of the requirement to purchase a 
vehicle that meets certain fuel economy standards under CARS, Vehicle 2BAU may be a 
less fuel efficient model than Vehicle 2CARS.  Vehicle 2BAU is driven for an expected 
lifetime of x2 miles before being retired and replaced with a third vehicle, and so on 
through the consumer’s life.  Once again, the scope of our analysis goes only through 



























Figure 2. Vehicle replacement schedules with and without CARS, across a fixed “time” 
period as measured in vehicle miles traveled (VMT).  Circles represent production and 
disposal of vehicles.  Our analysis is limited in scope to the emissions attributable during 
the lifespan of Vehicle 1 and Vehicle 2CARS, through mile x1+x2. 
 
 
2.2.2.3. Characterizing system differences with and without CARS.  The systems 
characterized in figure 2 suggest three sources of emissions differences with and without 
CARS (table 1).  First, between miles x1 and x2, the vehicle driven by a consumer who 
participates in CARS (Vehicle 2CARS) is more fuel-efficient than the vehicle driven in the 
absence of CARS (Vehicle 1).  This is the fuel economy effect modeled in most previous 
analyses.  Second, Vehicle 2CARS may be more fuel-efficient than Vehicle 2BAU, a benefit 
that accrues for all miles driven between x2 and x1+x2.  Third, within our time scope, the 



























of two full vehicles.  Without CARS, that consumer would have only been responsible 
for the production and disposal of Vehicle 1, and a portion of the production and disposal 
of Vehicle 2BAU (we allocate production and disposal impacts by VMT.)  The first two 
effects described above relate to emissions from the fuel cycle, whereas the third effect 
takes place in the vehicle production and disposal cycle.  
 
The extra vehicle-cycle emissions created through CARS occur because of somewhat 
earlier production and purchase of the second vehicle.  Importantly, though, those 
emissions as modeled here are not simply inevitable emissions shifted in time.  A portion 
of the emissions from the production and disposal are incremental emissions that would 
not have occurred without CARS.  If figure 2 were extended out indefinitely, the 
consumer who participated in CARS would always be responsible for the production of a 
partial additional vehicle compared to a consumer who did not participate in CARS.  
Those emissions are the ones we model here. 
 
Table 1. Key sources of emissions differences with and without CARS. 
Effect Part of Description 
1 Fuel cycle “Clunker” retired early, and miles remaining in its 
natural life instead driven in new, more fuel-efficient 
vehicle. 
2 Fuel cycle New vehicle purchased under CARS more fuel-efficient 




Premature retirement of “clunker” and manufacture of 
new vehicle under CARS cause additional production 
and disposal emissions. 
 
 
Defining the following variables, we model the impact of each effect for a single vehicle: 
 
pi = GHG emissions resulting from production of Vehicle i, for i =1, 2CARS, 2BAU 





mi = fuel economy (mpg) of Vehicle i, for i =1, 2CARS, 2BAU 
E = GHG emissions (upstream and combustion) per gallon of fuel 
x1 = lifetime VMT of vehicle retired early due to CARS program 
x2 = lifetime VMT of vehicle retired at end of natural life 
 
The emissions savings attributable to Effect 1 can be expressed as: 

















The incremental emissions attributable to Effect 3 can be expressed as: 
 ( )12 2 2 2
2
CARS CARS BAU BAU
xp d p d
x
+ − + (3) 
The sum of Effect 1 and Effect 2, minus Effect 3, equals the total per-vehicle emissions 
savings attributable to CARS:
( ) ( )12 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 2
CARS CARS BAU BAU
CARS BAU CARS
xE E E Ex x x p d p d
m m m m x
     
− − + − − + − +     
    
(4) 
 
We calculate the program’s total GHG emissions impact based on the average vehicle in 
CARS, multiplied by 677,081, the total number of participating vehicles. 
 
2.2.3. Data sources and assumptions for empirical analysis 
 
2.2.3.1. Official statistics on CARS.  The Department of Transportation (DOT) published 
data for the vehicles that were traded in and purchased through CARS.  These data (tables 
2 and 3) include number of vehicles by type (passenger car and three categories of light 





economy (m1) and odometer reading (x1) of traded-in vehicles were 15.7 mpg and 
160,167 miles, respectively.  Average fuel economy of new vehicles (m2CARS) was 24.2 
mpg.  As tables 2 and 3 show, in addition to fuel economy improvements in each vehicle 
category, some improvement can also be attributed to a substantial number of participants 
trading in light trucks for passenger cars. 
 
Table 2. Summary characteristics of vehicles traded-in through CARS.  (Note. Source: 
[13]. Average fuel economy is calculated as fleet harmonic mean.  Average odometer 
reading and average age are weighted averages by number of vehicles per category.) 









Passenger car 102,638 17.5 152,401 16.6 
Category 1 light truck 447,505 15.9 158,339 14.0 
Category 2 light truck 119,394 14.1 172,068 16.2 
Category 3 light truck 7,544 14.1a 185,948 16.3 
Total / average 677,081 15.7 160,167 14.8 
a Not available.  Assumed same as category 2 light trucks. 
 
Table 3. Summary characteristics of new vehicles purchased through CARS.  (Note. 
Source: [13]. Average fuel economy is calculated as fleet harmonic mean.) 




Passenger car 397,182 27.9 
Category 1 light truck 230,220 21.6 
Category 2 light truck 47,425 16.2 
Category 3 light truck 2,254 16.2a 
Total / average 677,081 24.2 




2.2.3.2. Fuel economy in absence of CARS.  Sivak and Schoettle [10] found that fuel 
economy of new purchased vehicles during CARS was up to 0.7 mpg greater than would 





presumably be attributed to CARS’ incentives.  Therefore, m2BAU is calculated as m2CARS 
– 0.7, or 23.5 mpg. 
 
In the absence of CARS, many consumers would likely have replaced their trade-in 
vehicle with a used vehicle, instead of a new one.  Those used vehicles may have had 
substantially lower fuel economy than those purchased through CARS, which would 
suggest a larger benefit than the 0.7 mpg differential we use to model Effect 2.  However, 
we assume that all vehicle purchases “flow through” the U.S. fleet.  Without CARS, the 
consumer selling a used vehicle would have purchased a new replacement, so that new 
vehicle (though it isn’t actually purchased by the same consumer) is the one we compare 
to the new vehicle purchased through CARS. 
 
2.2.3.3. VMT in absence of CARS.  Data for x2, the expected life of a vehicle in the 
absence of an incentive to retire it early, is not readily available.  In previous studies, 
traded-in vehicles have been estimated to have roughly three to five years of life 
remaining, at an average of 12,000 miles per year [2, 5, 9]; added to the odometer reading 
at the time of trade-in, this would imply total vehicle lifetimes of about 196,000 to 
220,000 miles.  For two reasons discussed below, we suspect these estimates are too high, 
and therefore overestimate the avoided GHG emissions. 
 
First, three to five years of additional use remaining on the “clunkers” may be an 
overestimate.  According to a DOT survey, participants would have kept their vehicles 
for, on average, another 2.52 years without CARS, and half intended to keep them for 
less than two years [28]. 
 
Second, although a typical U.S. vehicle is driven about 12,000 miles per year [29], annual 
VMT tends to decrease with vehicle age, so CARS trade-ins should have been driven less 
than the average.  In the DOT survey, participants indicated they drove their vehicles on 
average 9,412 miles in the year prior to CARS [1], close to what standard VMT 
schedules would predict for 14 to 16 year old cars and trucks (table 4).  Further, VMT 





Table 4. VMT schedule used to estimate miles remaining for CARS trade-in vehicles.  
(Note. Source: [30].) 
Vehicle age Passenger cars VMT ∆ Light trucks VMT ∆ 
14 9,633 - 10,396 - 
15 9,249 -3.99% 9,924 -4.54% 
16 8,871 -4.09% 9,468 -4.59% 
17 8,502 -4.16% 9,032 -4.60% 
18 8,144 -4.21% 8,619 -4.57% 
19 7,799 -4.24% 8,234 -4.47% 
20 7,469 -4.23% 7,881 -4.29% 
Average ∆ across cars and light trucks: -4.33% 
 
 
Assuming 9,412 VMT per year, decreasing at 4.33% per year for 2.52 years, vehicles had 
about 21,904 miles remaining at the time of trade-in.  This implies a total expected 
lifetime of 174,305 miles for passenger cars; 180,243 miles for category 1 light trucks; 
193,972 miles for category 2 light trucks; and 207,852 miles for category 3 light trucks.  
We used the weighted average lifetime VMT (x2) of 182,071 miles. 
 
2.2.3.4. Calculating greenhouse gas emissions.  Emissions factors from GREET models 
1.8c.0 and 2.7 [24] were used to calculate fuel cycle and vehicle cycle emissions, 
respectively.  The fuel cycle model provided an estimate for our emissions factor, E, of 
0.01117 metric tons CO2-e per gallon of fuel.  The vehicle cycle model provided data for 
CO2-e emissions from vehicle production and disposal for passenger cars (7.8 metric 
tons) and light trucks (10.1 metric tons).  Weighted by the number of vehicles in each 
category, we used a value of 9.76 metric tons for the sum of our variables p2 and d2.  For 
simplicity and lack of data, we assume that a consumer who wanted a light truck in the 
absence of CARS would not have purchased a passenger car as a result of CARS and vice 
versa, so that broad vehicle class is the same between Vehicle 2 under either scenario.  









2.3.1 Findings  
 
Using equation (4), we calculate that CARS reduced greenhouse gas emissions by 4.4 
million metric tons CO2-e.  As shown in figure 3, the improved fuel economy of CARS 
replacement vehicles compared to the “clunkers” (Effect 1) reduced emissions by about 
3.7 million metric tons (83% of net emissions reductions); the improved fuel economy of 
CARS replacement vehicles compared to non-CARS replacement vehicles (Effect 2) 
reduced emissions by about 1.5 million metric tons (35%); and the premature production 




Figure 3. Reduction in CO2-e emissions as a result of CARS.  Effects 1, 2, and 3 are as 
defined in table 1. 
  
 
Overall, through the lifetime of Vehicle 1 and Vehicle 2CARS (the shaded area in figure 
2a), the 677,081 “clunkers” and new vehicles participating in CARS were responsible for 





modeled in figure 2b for the same number of miles (in the shaded area), those vehicles 
would have produced nearly 151 million metric tons of emissions.  The 4.4 million metric 
tons of CO2-e avoided through CARS, therefore, represent a 2.9% savings over the 
business-as-usual emissions without the program. 
 
2.3.2. Modeling limitations and sensitivities 
 
2.3.2.1. CAFE standards.  The modeling of Effect 2 is based on a study comparing new 
vehicle purchases in July and August to what they would have been, in those months, 
without the program.  However, most Vehicle 2BAU purchases would have actually 
occurred several months to several years later.  But new, stricter Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy (CAFE) standards take effect in model year 2012 [31], consequently, any 
vehicle purchases that were moved forward from model year 2012 to the summer of 2009 
may have had a net negative impact on the vehicle’s fuel economy. 
 
According to the DOT consumer survey, 31% of consumers planned to keep their 
vehicles for at least another 3 years [28], at which point the replacement vehicle would 
have been subject to the new CAFE standards.  2012 standards are 5.8 mpg higher than 
2009 standards for passenger cars (33.3 versus 27.5), and 2.3 mpg higher for light trucks 
(25.4 versus 23.1) [31, 32].  We modeled the impact if 31% of passenger cars and light 
trucks purchased through CARS (Vehicle 2CARS) were, respectively, 5.8 and 2.3 mpg less 
fuel efficient than Vehicle 2BAU.  Under this scenario, CARS prevents only about 750,000 
metric tons of CO2-e emissions in total. 
 
2.3.2.2. Remaining vehicle lifetime.  As in prior studies, the total program impact is 
sensitive to assumptions about miles remaining.  We based our calculation of 21,904 
miles remaining per vehicle on the average miles driven in the year prior to CARS 
(9,412) and the average number of years consumers stated they would have kept their 
vehicles in the absence of CARS (2.52).  There was, however, considerable variability in 
consumers’ responses to these questions, especially the latter, which had a standard 





consumers were planning to “trade-in, sell or dispose of” their vehicle [33]; vehicles that 
would have been traded-in or sold may have had more years of use remaining than 
indicated in the survey.  Table 5 shows the sensitivity of emissions avoided through 
CARS to the assumption about mileage remaining for the average vehicle. 
 
Table 5. Sensitivity of overall program results to assumptions about miles remaining on 
trade-in in the absence of an early retirement incentive. 
Miles remaining CO2-e avoided 








a We use 21,904 miles in our calculations, 
which is based on the average 2.52 years 
remaining from the DOT consumer survey. 
b One-half standard deviation above the mean 
in the survey data would equal 4 years 
remaining, or 33,744 miles. 
 
 
2.3.2.3. Replacement vehicle miles traveled.  Our analysis assumes that replacement 
vehicles under CARS are driven the same number of miles, annually, as the vehicles they 
replace.  However, new vehicles might be driven more than their predecessors.  First, 
participants may experience a rebound effect, in which improved fuel economy reduces 
the per-mile cost of driving, resulting in more miles traveled.  Recent literature 
examining the empirical evidence for the rebound effect [34-36] indicates that up to 
about 10% of energy savings could be offset by an increase in miles traveled; this value is 
also utilized by NHTSA [31].  For this study, including a 10% rebound effect would 





Alternatively, some participants may drive the new CARS vehicle more but conserve 
total household VMT by reducing driving in another household vehicle.  The impact this 
could have on GHG emissions depends on the characteristics of the household’s other 
vehicles and the number of miles substituted, for which data is not available.  However, 
as long as the new CARS vehicle has better fuel economy than other household vehicles, 
this substitution would slightly increase the emissions savings attributable to the program. 
 
2.3.2.4. Longer-term behavior change.  Our analysis assumes that the short-term 
incentive provided by CARS results in only short-term behavior change, that is, the 
purchase of a more fuel-efficient vehicle with the rebate funds.  If the program helped to 
stimulate longer-term environmental consciousness in participating consumers, 
influencing their choice of vehicle, driving habits, or even non-transportation behaviors 
after the program ended, the impact in terms of emissions savings could be much larger 
than calculated here.  Previous research has shown that some accelerated retirement 
programs can help shift consumer vehicle preferences [37], however, more research on 




CARS had a moderately positive impact on emissions, causing a one-time reduction in 
life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of about 4.4 million metric tons, or just under 0.4% 
of total annual U.S. light-duty vehicle emissions [39].  This assessment takes into account 
the full life cycle impact of the program, from vehicle manufacturing and disposal to use-
phase combustion and upstream fuel cycle emissions. 
 
These avoided emissions are lower than those of other authors who have assessed the 
impact of CARS.  Abrams and Parsons [2, 3] expressed findings in terms of gallons of 
gasoline saved, but using the GREET model emissions factor, we can convert this to an 
implied 6.4 million metric tons CO2-e avoided.  Knittel [5] estimated per-vehicle CO2 
avoided, but only based on combustion-phase emissions, and without including other 





GHG (5% of total) emissions, his analysis would suggest 9.0 million metric tons CO2-e 
avoided.  Similarly, Sachs [9] calculated per-vehicle CO2 avoided, without upstream fuel 
or non-CO2 GHG emissions.  A fuller accounting of Sachs’ assumptions implies 10.7 
million metric tons CO2-e avoided.  Finally, as mentioned above, NHTSA [1] estimated 
savings of 9.5 million metric tons CO2-e avoided, including emissions avoided from the 
upstream fuel cycle, and including the benefit from consumers purchasing more fuel-
efficient vehicles under CARS than they otherwise would have. 
 
Our findings of 4.4 million metric tons avoided range from about 30% to 60% lower than 
these previous studies, for several reasons.  The differences are driven in large part by our 
assumption that traded-in vehicles had about 22,000 miles remaining, for reasons 
described in our methodology section.  Most other studies assumed, without justification, 
substantially longer remaining lives – as much as 60,000 miles, for example, in Sachs [9] 
– though some acknowledged they used generous assumptions.  Since emissions avoided 
from Effect 1 scale with the assumption of miles remaining in the old vehicle’s life, these 
assumptions play a large role in the total impact calculated.  Moreover, none of the other 
studies included the increase in emissions attributable to Effect 3, which in our study 
accounted for an 18% decrease in net emissions avoided. 
 
NHTSA’s calculations were based on more detailed consumer survey data than is 
available to the public at this time, but there appear to be two fundamental differences in 
methodology.  First, NHTSA assumed an increase in VMT on the new vehicle compared 
to the old one.  We discuss this possibility in section 3.2.3.  Second, and perhaps most 
importantly, NHTSA, like all other studies discussed, did not include the negative 
emissions impact from premature production and disposal of vehicles.  
 
CARS was intended to serve several purposes, not least of which was stimulating the 
economy (and in particular the automotive sector).  NHTSA [1] estimated that CARS 
provided for the creation of more than 38,000 direct jobs and many more indirect jobs, 
and that it contributed $4 to $8 billion to the gross domestic product (GDP).  However, if 





stimulus benefits, it would appear to be an extremely expensive way to mitigate GHGs.  
The program cost about $3 billion in taxpayer money, meaning the public cost for each 
metric ton of avoided GHGs was well over $600.  This is particularly high when 
compared to the estimated $13 price tag for a metric ton of CO2-e emissions reduction 
under the proposed American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 [40]. 
 
Considering the high cost and moderate GHG emissions reductions from CARS, we 
believe there is considerable work to be done to ensure that future accelerated vehicle 
retirement programs provide GHG emissions benefits at a reasonable cost.  Our analysis 
shows that it is important for policymakers to consider the full life cycle impact of 
programs encouraging early retirement, including the effect of early production and 
disposal of vehicles.  We also believe coordinating the timing of these programs with a 
regime of increasing fuel economy requirements is critical, as we showed that a program 
occurring shortly before improved fuel economy standards take effect could negate most 











3.1.1. Program overview 
 
In 2009, the US Congress passed the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save (CARS) 
Act, also known as the Car Allowance Rebate System or, more popularly, ‘Cash for 
Clunkers.’  The program encouraged consumers to scrap their fuel-inefficient vehicles 
(‘clunkers’) in exchange for a substantial rebate toward the purchase of a new, more fuel-
efficient vehicle.  Trade-in and new vehicles were required to meet specific fuel economy 
criteria, and were subject to several other requirements as well.  Three billion federal 
dollars were allotted toward the program, which by all accounts was a popular success, 
drawing nearly 700,000 participants and exhausting funding in just weeks [13].  The 
details of the program requirements and participating vehicles are available elsewhere 
(e.g., [1, 12]).  CARS was broadly intended to satisfy two objectives: first, to provide a 
fiscal stimulus to the US economy in general and to the struggling automotive sector in 
particular, and second, to benefit the environment by replacing some of the most 
polluting vehicles on the road with less polluting ones. 
 
3.1.2. Literature review 
 
There is a relatively large body of existing literature on accelerated vehicle retirement or 
scrappage programs, of which CARS is one example of dozens that have been 
implemented in the last several decades.  Early vehicle scrappage programs in the US 
were intended primarily to reduce emissions of conventional (criteria) pollutants emitted 
during vehicle operation [23].  Much of the early literature on these types of programs 
focused on the economic incentives and decisions that drive participation, and, given 
projections of participation, the magnitude of pollution reduction achievable.  For 





decisions and used data from a small vehicle retirement program in Delaware to test it.  
They found that, as expected, owners demand a higher incentive to scrap vehicles with 
higher market values.  Hahn [42] used Los Angeles vehicle fleet data to estimate, at 
different hypothetical prices, the vehicle scrappage rates and resulting avoided 
hydrocarbon (HC) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) pollution.  He found that programs are only 
likely to be cost-effective at reducing criteria pollutants if the price paid for vehicles was 
relatively low (less than $1,000) and if the programs were implemented in urban areas 
where the value of abating pollution is typically higher. 
 
In the last decade, with growing understanding of and concern for global climate change, 
more studies have included an assessment of, or even focused on, the impact of vehicle 
scrappage programs on energy use and associated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (e.g., 
[20-23]).  Studies on CARS’ environmental impact have focused primarily on GHG 
emission reduction (e.g., [2, 5, 6]) though two so far have also briefly examined criteria 
pollutant reductions [5, 7].  Abrams and Parsons [3] explicitly adopted a cost-benefit 
approach and used rough estimates of avoided emissions, number of participating 
vehicles, and scrapped vehicles’ market values to conclude that CARS cost $825 million 
more than the environmental benefits it provided. 
 
In a separate body of literature, researchers have examined the economic stimulus impact 
of CARS, looking at indicators such as number of new vehicle purchases, number of jobs 
created, and contribution to gross domestic product (GDP).  Findings of these studies 
have varied widely, and researchers have argued over the extent of economic benefits 
from the program.  Li et al [7] found that CARS stimulated about 390,000 new vehicle 
sales during the program, but that more than a third of those purchases would have 
occurred by December even in absence of the incentive.  They also estimated a short-
term increase in auto industry employment by 3,676 job-years, and a longer-term increase 
of 2,050 job-years.  Mian and Sufi [8] suggested that virtually all of the 360,000 new 
vehicle purchases during the program were pulled forward from June 2010 or earlier, 
meaning the program did not drive any long-term increase in vehicle purchases.  They 





found that CARS contributed to nearly 395,000 new vehicle sales through October 2009 
(but they did not estimate what portion of this increase was pulled forward from future 
months).  They also estimated that employment increased by about 40,000 job-years as a 
result of the program.  The US Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), which administered CARS, estimated that the 346,000 
new vehicle purchases during CARS were pulled forward from a six-year period; that the 
program created or saved 61,960 job-years; and that it contributed about four billion 
dollars to US GDP [1]. 
 
3.1.3. Cost and benefit framework 
 
We propose a framework for assessing a number of the economic and environmental 
costs and benefits of CARS (figure 4).  Costs are separated into two categories: those 
borne by the federal government (the three billion dollars allotted for rebates) and those 
borne by participating consumers.  Participants’ costs provided critical leverage to 
government funding for the program, and are therefore important to include when 
assessing the true expenditures allotted toward the goals and benefits of CARS.  For 
every $3,500 or $4,500 rebate provided by government funds, consumers needed to 
contribute thousands of dollars more (on average nearly $18,250) toward the new vehicle 
purchase.  Because these costs are all measured in dollars, we can relatively simply sum 
the government and consumer costs to arrive at total expenditures of more than $15 
billion. 
 
Benefits of the program fall under three categories: those providing macro-economic 
stimulus, those contributing to the public good (in this case, through improvements in the 
environmental impact of the US vehicle fleet), and those accruing to the individual 
consumers who participated in CARS.  Macro-economic stimulus effects include (but are 
not necessarily limited to) new vehicle sales, job creation, and GDP growth.  Public good 
benefits include any reduction in GHG and criteria pollutant emissions, which can be 
measured in both magnitude and estimated (non-market) economic value.  Benefits to 





of the rebate contribution toward a new vehicle, as well as the utility they get from the 
new vehicle.  The utility should equal or, more likely, exceed the amount paid by 
consumers for the vehicles, since if it were not at least that large, rational consumers 
would not have purchased the vehicles.  Part of the utility is derived from gasoline 
savings; with just under 700 gallons saved for the average participating consumer, this 
component of utility is worth about $1,100 to $2,800 per participant, or $740 million to 
$1.9 billion in aggregate (assuming gasoline retail costs of $1.59 to $4.05 per gallon, the 
minimum and maximum US average from January 2005 to the middle of August 2009 
[43]).  Unlike program costs, benefits are measured with different units.  Some are also 
not summable, as, for example, GDP growth includes the benefits from new vehicle 

















Figure 4. Cost and benefit framework for CARS.  (Note: benefits in bold are analyzed in 

























It is worth noting that many other second-order economic and environmental impacts of 
CARS may exist.  For example, the decreased supply of used vehicles may have priced 
some individuals out of the used vehicle market [44], keeping some ‘clunkers’ on the 
road that otherwise would have been scrapped.  New vehicle sales and new or saved 
employment may have resulted in increased sales and income tax collection for states and 
the federal government [4].  On the other hand, for cash-constrained consumers, the new 
vehicle purchase may have simply shifted spending away from other industries, 
potentially hurting other retail sectors [45].  CARS may have longer-term or larger-scale 
behavioral impacts on consumers [38], influencing later choices of vehicles and driving 
patterns, which are among the household behaviors with the greatest potential for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions [46].  This list of additional impacts from CARS is, of 
course, not exhaustive. 
 
3.1.4. New contributions 
 
Although a few existing studies have examined multiple impacts of the CARS program 
from both an environmental and economic perspective (e.g. [1, 7]), ours adds several 
important components.  First, we lay out a framework for thinking about the costs 
(including consumer costs) and benefits, both economic and environmental, resulting 
from the program, and gather data on some of these values from the literature.  Second, 
we calculate the values of two important benefit components that have been largely 
neglected in the existing literature.  One of these, the economic surplus, or “gift,” to 
consumers, has been popularly assumed to be generous, but has not been calculated in 
any existing study.  The other, the magnitude and value of avoided criteria pollutant 
emissions, has been roughly estimated in a few existing studies ([1, 5, 7]), but we 
perform a more rigorous analysis that takes into account the sizeable variation in the 
impact of pollutants across different geographic regions.  These two new calculations and 
our previous assessment of GHG reductions [6], along with other researchers’ estimates 
of new vehicle sales, job creation, and GDP growth, allow us to more fully account for 






3.2. Surplus value of rebate to participating consumers: the “gift” 
 
In exchange for scrapping their ‘clunkers’, participating consumers received rebates of 
either $3,500 or $4,500 toward the purchase of a new vehicle.  This option, of course, 
precluded consumers from selling or trading in vehicles for their market value.  Popular 
literature during CARS widely assumed that the rebate was substantially higher than the 
market value of vehicles being scrapped (e.g., [47-49]), based on the high participation 
and faster-than-expected exhaustion of available funds.  However, no studies to date have 
calculated the actual surplus value to consumers.  It is important to know whether, in fact, 
“the government’s deal was too good,” as reported in the New York Times [50], to help 




3.2.1.1. Data sources.  Data on the rebates provided to consumers is available from 
NHTSA [51].  For every participating vehicle, NHTSA provided the trade-in vehicle 
identification number (VIN), odometer reading, dollar value of the rebate, and location of 
the dealership where the transaction occurred, among other data.  Data on the July 2009 
trade-in market value of these same vehicles was collected from the National Automobile 
Dealers Association (NADA), through their e-Valuator® software.  See the 
supplementary materials for a more detailed description of the analysis. 
 
3.2.1.2. Calculations.  NADA trade-in market value data is proprietary.  We inputted 
each trade-in vehicle’s VIN, odometer reading, and location (state) into the e-Valuator® 
software, and collected output on the trade-in value.  Trade-in value was available under 
assumptions about the vehicle’s condition: “rough,” “average,” and “clean”.  Because 
condition was not known for vehicles scrapped through CARS, we consider a range of 
values in our results.  We calculate the per-vehicle consumer surplus as the difference 









As table 6 shows, the median trade-in market value for scrapped vehicles ranged from 
$1,075 for a vehicle in rough condition to $2,250 for a vehicle in clean condition.  Given 
the known value of rebates on each vehicle, then, we calculate that CARS provided 
participating consumers with a median surplus between $1,950 and $3,125, depending on 
the condition of the scrapped vehicle.  For a vehicle in average condition, the median 
surplus was $2,475.  As a whole, then, CARS provided participating consumers with a 
surplus of approximately $1.3 to $2.1 billion. 
 
Table 6. Market value and consumer surplus for vehicles traded-in under CARS, by 
vehicle condition.  (Note: Market value from NADA e-Valuator® software.  Per-vehicle 
surplus calculated as difference between market value and rebate). 
 
 
3.3. Value of avoided criteria pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Vehicles emit both greenhouse gases (GHGs) and criteria pollutants during use.  The 
process of producing fuels, as well as manufacturing and disposing of vehicles, also 
contributes to GHG and criteria pollutant emissions.  The presence of emissions from 
upstream fuel production and vehicle manufacturing and disposal suggests that a life 
cycle methodology is necessary for comprehensively calculating the change in emissions 
resulting from CARS.  Lenski et al [6] developed a life cycle framework to calculate the 
mass of avoided GHG emissions due to CARS; we employ this methodology here to 
calculate the mass of avoided criteria pollutants.  We then apply economists’ calculations 
of the marginal benefit of pollution abatement to calculate the value of the avoided 
emissions.  An important new contribution we provide is calculating this value while 
taking into account the different cost of pollutants in different geographic areas and at 
 Rough Average Clean 
Median trade-in market value per vehicle $1,075 $1,713 $2,250 
Median surplus (“gift”) per vehicle $3,125 $2,475 $1,950 





different source heights (ground level or stacks), whereas previous studies have simply 
assumed a national average or median cost from sources of all heights.  The difference is 
significant: we find actual benefits worth two to six times as much as if we had used a 




3.3.1.1. Data sources.  Data on the marginal benefit of pollution abatement for the 
criteria pollutants NOx, SOx, VOCs, PM2.5, and PM10, by US county, is sourced from 
Muller and Mendelsohn [52].  Data on the location of CARS transactions is available 
from NHTSA [51].  All vehicle transactions are linked to a dealership location, which in 
turn can be linked to the counties for which marginal pollution damage costs are 
calculated in [52].  NHTSA data also includes information on the participating trade-in 
and new vehicles, including vehicle category (passenger car, light truck), make and 
model, fuel economy, and odometer reading.  Argonne National Laboratory’s 
“Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transportation” (GREET) 
models 1.8c.0 and 2.7 provide emissions data for vehicles of different types, model years, 
and fuel economy [24].  GREET 1.8c.0 provides greenhouse gas and criteria pollutant 
emissions, per mile, for the fuel cycle (as defined and described in [6]).  GREET 2.7 
provides the same emissions data, per vehicle lifetime, for the vehicle production and 
disposal cycle.  See supplementary materials for a more detailed description of 
assumptions. 
 
3.3.1.2. Calculations.  Data on each CARS transaction is grouped by US county (the 
geographic level at which marginal pollution damage costs are available in [52]).  For 
each county, the following characteristics of the “average” trade-in and new vehicle are 
determined: fuel economy, model year, vehicle category (passenger car or light truck), 
and trade-in odometer reading.  Using GREET’s fuel cycle model, we calculate per-mile 







Then we calculate the emissions impact in each county, which is based on three effects, 
described more fully in Lenski et al [6].  In Effect 1, emissions are avoided as a result of 
more fuel-efficient vehicles being driven instead of the less-efficient clunkers they 
replace, for the 21,904 miles assumed to be remaining in the clunkers’ natural lifetime (as 
calculated in [6]). 
 
In Effect 2, emissions are avoided because CARS encouraged consumers to purchase 
more fuel-efficient vehicles than their next replacement vehicle would have been without 
the program, under “business as usual” (BAU).  We use findings by Sivak and Schoettle 
[10] that suggest new vehicles under CARS were up to 0.7 mpg more fuel-efficient than 
new vehicles would have been under BAU. 
 
In Effect 3, incremental vehicle cycle emissions are produced as new vehicles are 
manufactured and old vehicles discarded prematurely.  A portion of each new vehicle’s 
production and disposal emissions is attributable to the CARS program.  As described in 
[6], this portion is calculated based on the number of miles remaining in the clunker’s 
natural life at the time it was scrapped under CARS. 
 
The total magnitude of criteria pollutant reductions is calculated as the value of Effect 1 + 
Effect 2 – Effect 3, and the economic benefit of these reductions is calculated by 
multiplying each county’s emissions mass by the marginal benefit of avoided pollution 
from Muller and Mendelsohn [52].  For fuel cycle emissions – that is, those coming 
primarily from the combustion of fuel during vehicle use, but also from upstream fuel 
production – we use the value of abating ground-level emissions.  As discussed in [52], 
the economic benefit of abating ground-level emissions is typically higher (especially in 
urban areas) than abating those same emissions from high stacks, because people are 
more directly exposed to the ground-level emissions and therefore suffer worse health 
consequences.  Emissions from the vehicle production and disposal cycle occur not at the 
location of the vehicle’s use, but at the site of its production, as well as all the upstream 
production processes such as raw material extraction and processing.  These activities 





of better data, we assume that 100% of these emissions occur in the United States, and 
assign them the mean marginal pollution costs of low (<250 meters) and tall (>250 
meters) stack emissions in [52].  See supplementary materials for more details on the 
equations used to model these effects. 
 
We also consider the magnitude of GHG reductions as calculated in Lenski et al [6], and 
value these at $21 per metric ton, the midpoint social damage cost of CO2 estimated by 
the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) [53]. 
 
For simplicity, we ignore the timing of all emissions, and do not discount the value of 
emissions that are avoided years into the future.  Discounting would reduce the dollar 




According to our calculations, more than 20,000 metric tons of criteria pollutants were 
avoided through the CARS program, in addition to the approximately 4.4 million metric 
tons of CO2-equivalent GHGs avoided.  Nearly 28,000 metric tons of criteria pollutants 
were avoided through Effect 1 and Effect 2; these were partially offset by nearly 8,000 
metric tons of additional criteria pollutants emitted as a result of Effect 3. 
 
As table 7 shows, the abatement of criteria pollutants provided economic value of about 
$17 million, with about $21 million in benefits from Effect 1 and Effect 2 partially offset 
by a cost of $4 million from Effect 3.  Using our calculated mass of avoided criteria 
pollutants, but the average (expected) or median nationwide marginal damage costs 
(across all ground level and stack sources) from [52], as Knittel [5] and Li et al [7] do, 
results in benefits of just $6.9 and $2.6 million, respectively.  This dramatic difference in 
findings demonstrates the importance of considering the value of abating criteria 






The abatement of GHGs, valued at $21 per metric ton [53], added another $93 million of 
economic benefit to the program’s overall impact.  (At SCC’s low and high social 
damage cost estimates of $5 and $35 per metric ton, respectively, GHG abatement is 
worth $22 million and $155 million).  The mass and economic value of avoided GHGs 
dwarfed those of the criteria pollutants.  Valued at $21 per metric ton, GHGs accounted 
for 99.5% of abated pollution mass and 84.8% of the economic benefit.  See 
supplementary materials for a more detailed discussion of these results. 
 
Table 7. Mass and value of criteria pollutant and GHG emissions reductions from CARS. 
(Note: Numbers may not sum due to rounding.) 





Effect 1 14.0 13.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 27.8 3,682.8 
Effect 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,541.9 
Effect 3 3.4 1.1 0.5 0.7 2.0 7.7 795.1 
Net reduction 
(1+2-3) 10.5 12.7 (0.4) (0.7) (1.9) 20.2 4,429.6 
Value ($M) 
Effect 1 16.5 3.4 0.9 0.0 0.2 21.0 77.3 
Effect 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 32.4 
Effect 3 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.2 2.2 4.4 16.7 
Net benefit 





We calculated two new measures of the benefits of CARS.  First, we found that 
participants were given, on average, “gifts” of nearly $2,500 above the market value of 
their trade-in vehicles.  This value is critical because it can help inform whether the 
rebate amount offered was reasonable or too high, as many speculated.  Most scrappage 
programs to date have offered (and most literature has assumed) per-vehicle rebates of 
$500 to $1,000 [42], implying a maximum “gift” of that much as well, even if vehicles 
had zero market value.  Similarly, in a survey of potential participants in a Delaware 
scrappage program, Alberini et al [19] found that about half of respondents would have 
scrapped their vehicles for $1,000 (which the researchers also estimated was 





programs are substantially different than CARS in vehicle eligibility requirements, 
geographic scope, and number of participants.  Accordingly, we don’t have data to 
support speculation on how much of a “gift” would have been necessary to induce 
participation in CARS, but we suspect that $2,500 is on the high end.  The quick 
exhaustion of available funds implies there was more demand than was able to be 
satisfied with the three billion dollars allotted.  A lower rebate, or an auction mechanism 
for setting the rebate value, could very well have achieved higher participation (more 
vehicles scrapped) for the same government-funded cost, resulting in greater “bang for 
the buck” in terms of both economic stimulus and environmental benefits. 
 
Second, we found that the value of the avoided criteria pollutant and GHG emissions is 
approximately $110 million, although significant uncertainty about the value of abating 
GHG emissions could imply benefits as low as about $40 million or as high as about 
$170 million.  These environmental benefits seem relatively small, given the combined 
$15 billion spent on the program by participating consumers and the government.  The 
benefits we calculate are already likely somewhat overstated, as we ignore the timing of 
avoided emissions; if we had discounted the value of avoiding future emissions, the 
benefits would be somewhat smaller.  In particular, we found that including the benefit of 
avoided criteria pollutant emissions did not do much to increase the economic value of 
CARS’ environmental impact, since most of the benefit came from avoided GHG 
emissions.  This result is particularly interesting given that, in the past, most accelerated 
vehicle retirement programs have been aimed at reducing criteria pollutant emissions.  
The findings suggest that, because criteria pollutant emissions from vehicles are quite 
low compared to a decade or two ago, and because the rate of reduction has slowed, 
scrappage programs may no longer be appealing mechanisms for abating these pollutants. 
 
We summarized the literature on several other economic benefits of CARS: new vehicle 
sales, GDP growth, and job creation.  There was significant disagreement among some 
experts about these values, but we can nonetheless use their estimates to help put the 
emissions reduction and consumer surplus benefits we calculate in the larger context of 

























Figure 5.  Cost and benefits of CARS.  (Notes: a, b: sources are [1, 4, 7, 8]. c: source is 
[1]. d: range based on 4.4 million metric tons avoided, as calculated in [6], at benefit per 
metric ton of $5 to $35 as calculated in [53].) 
 
 
Overall, we suspect that given the high value of the rebates to consumers and the 
relatively low value of the emission reductions, there was significant opportunity to get 
more environmental and economic “bang for the buck” with CARS.  This could have 
been achieved with a lower rebate or an alternative rebate mechanism such as an auction, 
in which consumers bid for the opportunity to trade in their ‘clunker’ at a particular 
rebate level.  Presumably, more vehicles could have been traded in for the same three 
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could have been traded in for less than three billion dollars.  Further, the environmental 
“bang for the buck” could have been improved with more stringent criteria for the 
clunkers and/or new vehicles, or, potentially, by targeting the program to geographic 
areas where the marginal damage cost from emissions is particularly high, and therefore 
the value of abating them is high as well. 
 
3.5. Supplementary materials 
 
3.5.1. Additional assumptions for calculation of consumer surplus 
 
NADA E-Valuator did not have market value data available for vehicles from before 
model year 1990.  We assumed all these vehicles had market values of $0 if in rough 
condition, $250 in average condition, and $500 in clean condition.  These may be 
somewhat generous assumptions as they are close to what we found for the 1990 model 
year vehicles, and some of the pre-1990 model year vehicles were substantially older.  In 
addition to the pre-1990 model year vehicles, there were 14,439 other vehicles for which 
no trade-in value was available, either because the VIN had an error, the trade-in 
occurred in a US territory instead of one of the 50 states, or because NADA otherwise 
couldn’t find a value.  We assumed that vehicles had no add-ons (for example, sunroofs, 
premium media systems, etc.) other than those that were automatically selected by 
NADA E-Valuator when given the VIN (for example, four wheel drive on many 
vehicles).  Most of these add-ons would be valued at about $50-300 on a trade-in, so 
inclusion of add-ons on some vehicles should not dramatically change our findings about 
the value of the consumer surplus. 
 
3.5.2. Additional assumptions for calculation of criteria pollutant emissions 
 
Our research assumes that CARS participants drive in the same county where they 
purchased their new vehicle; this may not always be exactly the case, of course, but no 
better data on participants’ home location or driving habits is available.  We also assume 





were purchased.  The transaction location data in [51] needed significant manual cleaning 
due to typographical errors, and while every effort was made to catch and correct these 
errors, some may remain. 
 
Missing information and typographical errors were also found for other data in [51].  For 
vehicles missing fuel economy data, we assume trade-ins got 15.7 miles per gallon (mpg) 
and new vehicles got 24.2 mpg, the fleet harmonic means found in [6].  Thousands of 
trade-in vehicles appeared to have incorrect odometer readings (either very low or 
exceptionally high, with a range from 0 to nearly 10 million).  Consequently, all 
calculations rely on the average odometer reading for the entire passenger car or light 
truck fleet (152,401 miles and 161,555 miles respectively, as calculated in [6]), rather 
than the particular odometer reading of any vehicle or subset of vehicles. 
 
Several other assumptions were made for characteristics of the “average” trade-in and 
new vehicle in each county.  Fuel economy is calculated as the fleet harmonic mean for 
each county, rounded to the nearest whole number.  Model year is rounded to the nearest 
5 years, the frequency at which GREET calculates pollutant emissions levels.  The few 
counties with an average trade-in vehicle older than 1990 are given a model year of 1990 
for emissions calculations purposes, as this is the earliest year available in GREET.  New 
vehicles are all assumed to be 2010 model year for emissions calculations purposes.  The 
vehicle category – passenger car or light truck – is based on which type made up the 
majority of trade-in or new vehicles in that county. 
 
Carbon monoxide (CO) is not evaluated in [52], and the damage costs from CO pollution 
are not as well studied or published as other pollutants.  In some studies, CO pollution is 
assumed to have zero cost, as low ambient concentrations have very limited effects [54].  
In one study, CO is estimated to cause health effects worth between $0.01 and $0.09 
(1991 dollars) per kilogram throughout the United States, and as high as $0.18 per 
kilogram in Los Angeles [55].  We exclude CO from most analyses but consider its 






The mass of PM10 emissions was calculated as the difference between GREET’s PM10 
and PM2.5 emissions, to avoid double-counting PM2.5 emissions, and to match the 
marginal pollution cost calculations in [52]. 
 
3.5.3. Formulas for calculation of avoided criteria pollutant emissions 
 
Defining the following variables, we model the magnitude of each effect for each 
particular pollutant: 
 
nc = number of vehicles participating in CARS in county c, for c = 1, 2, … , 2276, 2277 
Ei = fuel cycle (upstream and combustion) emissions per mile for Vehicle i, for i = 1, 
2CARS, 2BAU where 1 is the average trade-in vehicle in a county, 2CARS is the average new 
vehicle purchased under CARS in a county, and 2BAU is the counterfactual average new 
vehicle in a county under the “business as usual” scenario 
pi = emissions resulting from production of Vehicle i, for i = 1, 2CARS, 2BAU 
di = emissions resulting from disposal of Vehicle i, for i = 1, 2CARS, 2BAU 
x1 = lifetime VMT of vehicle retired early due to CARS program 
x2 = lifetime VMT of vehicle retired at end of natural life 
 
The emissions savings attributable to Effect 1 can be expressed as: 
 ( )( )
2,277
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The emissions savings attributable to Effect 2 can be expressed as: 





























The process described above captures just over 669,000 of the more than 677,000 vehicle 
transactions in CARS.  Some were excluded because they occurred in counties for which 
the marginal cost of pollution was not available, or had other missing values that made 
them uncountable.  We adjust our calculations to include these missing vehicles, 
assuming they emitted pollutants at our mean rate per vehicle, and valuing their 
emissions at our mean rate per metric ton. 
 
3.5.4. Additional detail and description of results regarding criteria pollutant emissions 
 
Effect 2 had very little impact on criteria pollutant mass or value (whereas in [6] it was 
found to play an important role in the program’s impact on GHG emissions).  This is a 
result of the fact that criteria pollutant emissions are regulated and measured on a per-
mile basis, and therefore have no direct correlation to a vehicle’s fuel economy.  The 
reduction in criteria pollutants from Effect 1 results from improved pollution control 
between older and new vehicles, rather than from improvements in fuel economy.  Since 
Effect 2 measures only the benefit of improved fuel economy, the impact is negligible.  
SOx is the only exception – since more than 90% of fuel cycle SOx emissions occur 
upstream in the fuel production process, rather than during vehicle operation itself, these 
emissions are correlated to a vehicle’s fuel economy. 
 
VOCs contributed more than 50% of the mass of avoided criteria pollutants, and more 
than 90% of the economic value of criteria pollutant abatement.  Per-mile fuel cycle 
emissions of VOCs have declined dramatically (by more than 80%) from model year 
1990 to model year 2010 vehicles , so replacing older vehicles with newer ones creates a 
substantial reduction in VOCs emitted during the fuel cycle, although this benefit is 
partially offset by the relatively large VOC emissions from the vehicle production and 
disposal cycle.  And although the mean marginal pollution cost of VOCs in US counties 
is low, a large number of CARS transactions occurred in regions with extremely high 
marginal costs.  Accordingly, a metric ton of VOC avoided through Effect 1 delivered 
nearly $1,200 in value, whereas the incremental VOC emissions from Effect 3 cost just 





Similarly, NOx accounted for a large portion of the avoided criteria pollutants by mass, as 
per-mile fuel cycle emissions have declined by about 80% in the last 20 years.  However, 
the economic impact of avoided NOx emissions was quite small at just over $3 million.  
The mean value of abating a metric ton of NOx through Effect 1 was just $246, skewed in 
part because in several metropolitan areas with a large number of CARS transactions 
(Los Angeles County, for example), abating NOx is costly, not beneficial.  In these 
locations, where the underlying NOx concentration is high enough, additional NOx 
emissions actually help reduce ozone concentrations [56], providing a net economic 
benefit. 
 
Emissions of PM2.5, PM10, and SOx all appear to have increased as a result of CARS.  
These pollutants are emitted at very low rates during the fuel cycle and their emission 
rates have changed very little since 1990, leading to small savings from Effect 1 and 
Effect 2.  However, the vehicle production and disposal cycle produces substantial 
emissions of all three of these pollutants, so premature production of new vehicles 
actually leads to an increase in net emissions.  For PM2.5, the value of avoided fuel cycle 
emissions from high-value areas (where many CARS transactions occurred) is high 
enough to offset the cost of additional vehicle cycle emissions that we assumed were 
spread throughout the country.  For PM10 and SOx, the cost of incremental emissions 
from Effect 3 more than offsets the value of abatement from Effect 1 and Effect 2, 
therefore these pollutants impose a net cost. 
 
3.5.5. Additional sensitivity analysis for criteria pollutant emissions 
 
We also consider the impact of including economic benefit from avoided CO pollution.  
We assume the marginal benefit of a metric ton of CO avoided to be $62.88 (the average 
of McCubbin and Delucchi’s “low” and “high” US estimates [55], adjusted for inflation 
to 2000 dollars to match the rest of the analysis).  We find that CARS prevented about 








A life cycle framework was developed to assess the mass of avoided greenhouse gas and 
criteria pollutant emissions from the CARS program.  CARS was found to have 
prevented approximately 4.4 million metric tons of CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas 
emissions, and 20,000 tons of criteria pollutant emissions.  Using existing values for the 
damage costs associated with such emissions, the program is estimated to have created 
$110 million in (non-market) public-good economic benefits.  These benefits are placed 
in the context of other economic benefits of CARS, including macroeconomic impacts 
such as new vehicle sales, increase in employment, and GDP growth.  The benefits to 
participating individuals, in the form of the rebate toward the purchase of a new vehicle, 
are also calculated.  This consumer surplus, or “gift”, is found to be worth approximately 
$1 to $2 billion in aggregate.  These benefits are compared to the government and 
consumer funds used for the purchase of the new vehicles, which totaled more than $15 
billion. 
 
CARS was not the first accelerated vehicle retirement program employed to reduce 
emissions, nor is it the last (since CARS’ conclusion, such programs have been 
introduced in several European nations, and similar types of programs targeting different 
energy-consuming devices, such as household appliances, have been considered or 
implemented across the US).  This research offers several important findings from CARS 
that can help policymakers as they develop these programs in the future.  In particular, 
we have shown how the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is highly sensitive to 
vehicles’ remaining lifetime and to the timing of scrappage programs relative to 
scheduled improvements in vehicle fuel economy.  Policymakers can consider how 
requirements for age, condition, or odometer reading of eligible vehicles might increase 
pollution reduction benefits, and ensure that programs are offered at times that maximize 
consumers’ purchases of the most fuel-efficient vehicles likely to be available in the near 
future.  Moreover, we have demonstrated that the economic benefits of criteria pollutant 
reduction were higher than might otherwise be predicted because many of the vehicle 





policies might take advantage of this by targeting geographic regions where pollution 
abatement is particularly important or valuable.  Finally, we have established that the 
consumer surplus, or “gift” to participating consumers, was higher than has been offered 
in previous programs and may have been greater than necessary to induce participation.  
More environmental and economic “bang for the buck” could be achieved by setting 
rebates at a more appropriate level, perhaps through an auction mechanism or some other 
system more closely linked to vehicles’ market value. 
 
There is substantial opportunity to continue researching CARS, and we intend to expand 
upon the analysis presented here.  First, it would be interesting to study the geographic 
relationship between participation rates, consumer surplus, emission reductions, and 
economic value of emission reductions.  Some areas of the US certainly benefited more 
than others from CARS, and in different ways.  Second, it would be useful to explore the 
timing of accelerated, postponed, and avoided emissions.  Particularly with greenhouse 
gases, the urgent need to mitigate and the potential for tipping-point effects at various 
(unknown) levels of atmospheric concentration suggest that there may be greater value 
(even after accounting for discounting of economic benefits, which we did not include 
here) to more immediate reductions in emissions.  Finally, it would be valuable to learn 
about consumers’ willingness to scrap their ‘clunkers’ at different rebate levels, to help 
understand how much larger than necessary the CARS rebates really were, and how to set 
incentive levels more appropriately in the future.  A survey of consumers with vehicles 
eligible for trade-in under CARS (both those who participated and those who chose not 
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